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comprehensive answer because so many aspects of the use of
Predators and other drones' remain unknown to the public. It
appears to be established that this type of weapon is one of the
mainstays of the U.S. campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban.
The Obama administration, upon taking office, quickly increased
the number of drone strikes being conducted over the rate that
had prevailed during the Bush administration,' and the increased
tempo has continued.' The frequency with which drones have
been used, and the wide range of circumstances in which they have
brought into action, makes it impossible to give a unitary answer to
the legality of the strikes as judged against international standards.
To the extent that U.S. armed forces conduct drone attacks
against their adversaries in Afghanistan, the use of drones would
seem to be no more likely to violate international law than the use
of other weapons, and perhaps less so. 4 If based on sound
intelligence, including the extensive surveillance conducted by
drones and other aircraft, an appropriately planned and wellconducted attack using a drone or drones may be more likely to hit
a proper target, and less likely to kill or injure civilians, than attacks
by fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, or artillery. It is not possible to
assess, based on the available information, how close the U.S.
military's use of drones in Afghanistan comes to the goal of
complete compliance with the Geneva Conventions and other
aspects of the law of armed conflict, but I do not believe that the
use of drones, as such, suggests that violations of international law
are more likely than they otherwise would be in a conflict of the
type that is underway there.
1. The Predator B (often known as the Reaper) is a larger, faster, and more
The manufacturer, General Atomics
capable version of the Predator.
Aeronautical, has described the capabilities of the Reaper. See Predator B, GEN.
http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator
AERONAUTICAL,
ATOMICs
.b.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2011) ("Predator B has the capacity to conduct
multiple missions simultaneously due to its large internal and external payload.").
2. Mark Mazzetti & David E. Sanger, Obama Expands Missile Strikes Inside
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/21
/washington/21policy.html? r=2.
3. See, e.g., Tarna Mckelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13,
http://www.newsweek.com/2011/02/13/inside-the-killing-machine.html
2011,
("Bush authorized 42 drone strikes . . . . The number has more than quadrupled
under President Obama - to 180 at last count.").
4. See, e.g., Isabel Kershner, Israeli PanelFinds No Crime in 2002 Assassination,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/28/world
/middleeast/28israel.html (noting that the one-ton bomb, dropped by an F-16,
that killed Sheik Salah Shehada also killed at least thirteen innocent civilians).
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Somewhat different questions arise with regard to the use of
drones to conduct attacks on targets in Pakistan, but my answer is
probably the same. U.S. combat operations within Afghanistan do
not constitute violations of Afghanistan's sovereignty. Of course,
there have been continuing and, at times, strident objections by
Afghanistan to particular air strikes conducted by the United
States, but those have primarily been in response to civilian
casualties resulting from conventional air attacks, not those
conducted by drones.5
Pakistan's public stance toward drone strikes is different.
Plainly, Pakistan has allowed such attacks to be conducted within its
territory, but it has never said so publicly and presumably cannot
do so in light of the domestic political environment within
Pakistan. This does not affect the legality of the program under
international law. Under all the circumstances, there cannot be
any real doubt about the fact that the United States is not violating
Pakistan's sovereignty, but is instead conducting a joint program
with that state even though the relationship between the
collaborators remains touchy, the boundaries of what is allowed
and what is not are imprecise, and public disclosure is minimal.
If one focuses on the drone strikes in Pakistan as opposed to
those in Afghanistan, it becomes more necessary to ask who is at
the controls of the aircraft and who is pulling the trigger to launch
the Hellfire missiles. The strikes in Afghanistan are likely to be
conducted by the armed forces. For attacks in Pakistan, it is likely
that employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are operating
the drones. This raises the question of whether attacks that will
have consequences similar to those traditionally associated with
armed conflict may be carried out by civilians, who are not in
uniform and not subject to a military chain of command.
5. See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Military Apologizes for Civilian Deaths in
Afghanistan,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
4,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/10/04/world/asia/04afghan.html.
6. Even if Pakistan objected to the use of drones in its territory,
international law would not prevent the United States from exercising its right of
self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter by striking those who
are participating in an armed attack against the United States from within
Pakistan. JordanJ. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibilityof
U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'LL. & POL'Y 237, 249-58 (2010).
7. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The PredatorWar: What Are the Risks of the C.LA.'s Covert
Drone Program, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 36, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa-fact mayer.
8. Gary Solis has emphatically argued that they may not. See Gary Solis, CIA
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Based on what I know, I believe that the use of drones by the
Obama administration complies with international law. However,
there are a number of potential implications of the drone program,
and possible use or expansion of it beyond the terms of the
question, that are potentially troubling. First, since this type of
weapon seems to have the potential to conduct a surgical strike that
is much more precise than those conducted by traditional weapons,
it may generate an almost irresistible temptation to conduct attacks
that would never be attempted or even contemplated, except for
the availability of drones, thus raising many new and difficult
questions. Second, the question as stated concerned only a state in
which open combat is underway (Afghanistan), and another that is
being used as a refuge and staging area for that war (Pakistan).
Different questions are raised by the use of drones to conduct
attacks far away from a battlefield. The apparently successful attack
conducted in 2002 in Yemen has not generated substantial
controversy,9 but any effort to conduct attacks in the future that are
not related to combat could raise difficult questions concerning the
position taken by the state within which the drone would be used,
the identity of the target or targets, and the availability of other
means (law enforcement, diplomatic, or judicial) to go after the
contemplated target at the relevant time and place. Third, the
question as stated does not present an occasion for delving into the
very difficult domestic constitutional questions concerning the
Drone Attacks Produce America's Own Unlawful Combatants, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/11
2010,
/AR2010031103653.html. Even though Jordan Paust disagrees with much of what
Mary Ellen O'Connell has written about the principles of international law
applicable to drone attacks, he concurs in her judgment that if those conducting
drone attacks "are not members of the regular armed forces of a party to an
international armed conflict, they are unprivileged fighters . . . ." Paust, supra note
6, at 277. He recognizes that some acts not authorized by the law of armed
conflict may be permissible if taken under Article 51 as self-defense. Id. at 278-79.
Kenneth Anderson argues that "[s]elf-defense, not combatancy under armed
conflict, is in fact the legal category that applies," and that drone attacks "are as
justifiable when the CIA is tasked to carry them out secretly as when the military
does so in open armed conflict." Kenneth Anderson, Predators over Pakistan,
Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles
WEEKLY STANDARD,
/predators-over-pakistan?page=1.
9. SeeJames Risen & David Johnston, Threats and Responses: Huntfor Al Qaeda;
Bush Has Widened Authority of C.LA. To Kill Terrorists, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/15/world/threats-responses-hunt-for-al-qaedabush-has-widened-authority-cia-kill.html (reporting that in November 2002, the
CIA killed al Qaeda leader Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi and five others by firing a
Hellfire missile at a car in a remote region of Yemen).
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manner in which the executive may compile a list of those to be
targeted in drone attacks, or the question of whether and how such
executive decisions might be subject to judicial review. 0
4. IS CURTISS-WRTGHT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER
CORRECT?

It is very difficult to quarrel with Curtiss-Wright's disposition of
the issue before the Court in that case. The problem was not one
of Congress v. the President (as Steel Seizure was later considered to
be), but rather an explicit authorization by Congress for the
President to do precisely what he did. However, at the time, the
Supreme Court was still laboring under the very restrictive
approach to delegation that constituted one front in the wideranging battle over the constitutionality of the legislative program
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Given the anemic nature of the
general nondelegation doctrine that emerged after the courtpacking fight and FDR's Supreme Court appointments, there is no
reason to doubt the correctness of the conclusion that there was no
delegation problem in Curtiss-Wright,but there is also little need to
rely upon the Court's analysis of that issue.
The well-known "sole organ" language in Curtiss-Wright" raises
entirely different issues. Its atmospheric content is very potent, and
therefore the case is one that the executive cites frequently and
with enthusiasm. What tends to get lost in this traditional
invocation of Curtiss-Wrightis the fact that Congress had authorized
the President to take the action he had, greatly diluting the force of
this precedent in the situations in which it is often being relied on
most heavily-in separation-of-powers disputes in which Congress
has either been silent or has, or is at least alleged to have, legislated
contrary to the act taken by the President. The other aspect of
Curtiss-Wright that tends to get overlooked in the executive's
10. See, e.g., Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted
Killing of Terrorists,31 CARDOZO L. REv. 405 (2009). A lawsuit brought by the father
of a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen alleged to have been targeted for killing by the
United States was recently dismissed for lack of standing and on the basis of the
political-question doctrine. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
The former Acting General Counsel of the CIA has stated that sometimes "the
evidence against an individual would be thin ... that the person was thought to be
at a meeting." Mckelvey, supra note 3, at 37. His report that the authorizations
were rejected in such cases does not provide adequate assurance that the
procedures being followed are acceptable.
11. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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enthusiasm for the case is that the statement by thenRepresentative John Marshall quoted by Justice Sutherland is only
that the President "is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."" Of
course the President must have a monopoly over the channels
through which the United States communicates with other states,
and he or she decides what messages to send other states, when,
and who the proper recipients of the messages are. However, that
does not mean that the President has unbounded unilateral
authority to set and implement the policies of the United States
toward other states, and it certainly does not mean that the
President is entitled to unilaterally threaten the use of force, or use
force, in the international realm as an incident of the narrower
diplomatic role described by Curtiss-Wight.2
5. HAS PRESIDENT OBAMA IMPROVED BUSH'S NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICIES?

Yes. Understandably, the 9/11 attacks that took place before
President Bush had completed even one year in office evoked
forceful, far-reaching, and dramatic responses. The devastating
losses suffered by the United States that day, and the awareness that
additional attacks might well be in preparation, called for urgent
and energetic responses. The President had every reason to expect
that Congress would give him substantial leeway in deciding how to
respond to al Qaeda's war against the United States, and that it
would support the policies he formulated, and he was correct. The
AUMF granted him broad authority, including that to initiate and
conduct the war in Afghanistan, and it was followed by such
sweeping legislation as the USA PATRIOT Act and the massive
governmental reorganization that created the Department of
Homeland Security.
However, a number of the national security policies adopted
and executed by President Bush went beyond what was needed to
respond to 9/11, and over time it became increasingly apparent
that the administration placed an inappropriately high emphasis
on vindicating and expanding executive power, without regard to
whether unilateral (and often secret) programs adopted by the
executive were the most effective way to neutralize al Qaeda and
12.
13.

Id. at 319.
Id.
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other terrorists. Thus, without consulting Congress or drawing
upon the expertise of military attorneys, the administration
precipitately announced its ill-conceived and ill-fated plan to use
military commissions to punish those fighting or plotting against
the United States. The President's executive order setting up the
commissions was a crude, cut-and-paste effort based on FDR's
successful (though troubled) decision to use a military tribunal to
try the eight German saboteurs captured on U.S. territory in 1942.
Little thought was given to the appropriateness of using a similar
approach to punish the hundreds or thousands of enemy fighters
who might be captured in Afghanistan, nor was any effort made to
draw upon the sophisticated court-martial procedures developed
after World War II, or to the principles of international law that
govern tribunals convened to punish enemy fighters. As is well
known, this cavalier approach led to endless modifications
designed to improve the plan originally announced, and three
rounds of litigation in the Supreme Court, interspersed with
legislation.
Much of the turmoil over the military commissions could have
been avoided if the Bush administration had not been so
determined to act alone. As the Detainee Treatment Act and the
Military Commissions Act demonstrate, it is overwhelmingly likely
that Congress would have been supportive, and there is no doubt
that much of the wasted effort and delay caused by the
Any plan for
commissions' plan could have been avoided.
detention of enemy fighters and punishment of those guilty of war
crimes or terrorism developed in consultation with Congress,
military lawyers, and outside interest groups would have been far
superior to the plan drafted in secret by the Bush administration
and emerging full grown, as from the head of Zeus.
In many other areas, the national security policies of the Bush
administration were afflicted with the same obsessive commitment
to unilateral executive power that doomed the military
commissions. For example, in the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress
amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and
other statutes to strengthen the tools available in the fight against
terrorism. What the administration did not do was ask Congress to
make the additional changes in FISA that were necessary to make
legal the domestic wiretapping program unilaterally adopted by the
President soon after 9/11 and not disclosed until the end of 2005.
A consensus has emerged that at least some parts of the program
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authorized by the President were inconsistent with FISA, but after
several years of legislative hearings, litigation, and public
discussion, Congress accepted the administration's request that
FISA be amended to account for changes in telecommunications,
such as the increasing use of fiber optic cable rather than satellites
for many messages. Congress amended FISA in 2008 to allow the
types of communications interceptions that the administration
identified as necessary, and provided immunity for the companies
that assisted in the prior interceptions carried out by the Bush
administration. Surely Congress would have been receptive to a
request by President Bush in 2001 to amend FISA to give the
authority later approved in 2008, but the administration apparently
did not want to ask for that legislation. As with the military
commissions, an approach based on extreme claims of executive
power and bolstered by secrecy was preferred.
The examples already given are but selected aspects of the
defective national security policies of the Bush administration.
Equally disturbing and well documented are such programs as
extraordinary renditions, the torture of detainees in U.S. custody,
and the decision to invade Iraq based on the erroneous theory that
the government of Saddam Hussein possessed active programs for
manufacturing weapons of mass destruction that were close to
success.
The urgency with which the Bush administration
addressed national security after 9/11 was understandable.
However, many of the policies adopted were poorly thought out,
insular, weakened by extreme secrecy, illegal, and driven by a
determination to rely exclusively on an extreme conception of
executive power.
My assessment of the national security policies of the Bush
administration is a harsh one. The policies of the Obama
administration are harder to judge, since the administration has
only been in office for two years and many aspects of the policies
being implemented are not known to the public. However, to the
extent that it is possible for me to make a judgment at this point, I
find the Obama policies to be dramatically improved over those of
his predecessor. The illegal torture and rendition programs have
ended. The Guantanamo detention facility remains in operation
despite President Obama's announcement that it would be closed a
year after he took office, yet it seems unfair to blame him for this
failure. From all appearances, the administration has done a
conscientious job of attempting to assemble the facts relating to
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each of the detainees, to assess issues of culpability, proof, and
dangerousness, and to explain to judges why it wants to continue to
hold certain detainees while pursuing the difficult task of finding
places to send those whom it does not want to hold or whom it has
been told it cannot continue to hold.
On a number of fronts, the advances made by the new
administration have been notable. The United States has begun to
resume its proper place in the international community as a
supporter of international law and its institutions, as opposed to
the reflexively hostile approach taken by the Bush administration.
Even as to the International Criminal Court, which had raised
concerns even in the eyes of the Clinton administration, and as to
which the Bush administration worked itself into a frenzy of
opposition, the United States is now pursuing a policy of friendly
and constructive engagement, even though party status may well
remain far in the future. Secrecy about national security policies
and their formulation was given a great emphasis in the Bush
administration, while the Obama administration seems to be doing
a reasonable job of living up to its commitment to greater
openness.
For example, many of the details of the harsh
interrogation of detainees in CIA custody and the disingenuous
justification provided by the Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel were disclosed, despite misgivings by intelligence officials
within the Obama administration. The total amount of the
intelligence budget was publicly released for the first time as a
routine matter.
Overall, the administration seems to be
aggressively prosecuting individuals and groups thought to be
involved in terrorist plots, and even government officials accused of
releasing classified information," without engaging in the
inflammatory rhetoric and extreme claims that sometimes
characterized the responses of the prior administration.
There has been plenty of continuity to go with the change in
national security policies. The Obama administration continues to
14. Steven Aftergood, A New Milestone in Intelligence Budget Disclosure, SECRECY
NEWS (Feb. 15, 2011, 1:51 PM),
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2011/02
/intelbud-request.html.
15. See, e.g., Greg Miller, Former CIA Officer Jeffrey A. Sterling Charged in Leak
Probe, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR2011010604001.html?nav=emailpage
(reporting that Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists stated
that the five leaks cases brought by the Obama administration "exceed the total for
all previous administrations").

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 11

5124

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:5

aggressively assert the state secrets privilege, although not as
broadly as was done by the Bush administration.
Immunity
doctrines continue to be invoked to shield the officials responsible
for torture, rendition, and illegal wiretapping. Aggressive defenses
are asserted in almost all of the habeas corpus cases involving the
Guantanamo detainees, and appeals are taken when the district
judge finds that the detainee is entitled to release. Since almost all
of these matters involve positions inherited from the Bush
administration, it is difficult to say in some circumstances what the
policies of the Obama administration are. It would be inefficient
and perhaps even irresponsible for a new executive to attempt to
rework every issue in every pending case as if it could write on a
blank slate. There are many particular instances of which I am
aware-involving state secrets claims, immunity, and Freedom of
Information Act issues, for example-where I profoundly disagree
with what the new administration has done. However, I believe
that responsible officials are thoughtfully formulating positions
intended to protect the national security of the United States while
complying with the law.
My preliminary assessment is that the national security policies
of the Obama administration are markedly better than those of the
Bush administration, especially in light of the many difficult
matters that were inherited.
6. SHOULD KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED EVER BE BROUGHT TO
TRIAL?

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) may present an insoluble
problem in this regard. While the full details of his involvement in
the 9/11 attacks and other attacks on the United States are not
publicly available, based on the report of the 9/11 Commission it
appears indisputable that he has committed heinous acts that merit
the most severe punishment. It also seems clear that he was
tortured by the CIA in an effort to prevent future attacks like those
of 9/11. Perhaps a fair trial could be conducted in federal court,
although there have been substantial obstacles put in the way of
that course, and it would be very difficult to reconcile any
acceptable notion of procedural fairness with the history of torture
16.

See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh

Mohammed,
THE
NEW
YORKER,
Feb.
15,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/02/15/100215fafactmayer.
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17

in his case.
At least so long as the conflict between the United States and
al Qaeda continues, the best (and perhaps the only acceptable)
course seems to be to hold KSM as a captured enemy fighter who
must be kept from returning to the field against the United States.
Allowing him to go free is unacceptable.

7.

IS THE THREAT POSED BY A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN AS SERIOUS AS
THE P5+1 (UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, RUSSIA, CHINA,
FRANCE, AND GERMANY) REPRESENT IT TO BE?

In light of the dramatic recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya, among other states in the Middle East, this question is even
more difficult to answer than it was when framed by the editors of
the Journal of the National Security Forum several months ago.
Moreover, there are some indications that Iran's nuclear program
has suffered serious reversals that may delay it for a substantial
period, perhaps years. Plainly, Iran's influence on its region and
the world does not depend exclusively on its possible future
acquisition of nuclear weapons and delivery systems for them, nor
is Iran itself immune from the changes underway in so many other
states.
As to the magnitude of the threat raised by Iran's effort to
acquire a nuclear capability, I do not feel that I have anything to
add to the immense speculation that has been published already,
some of it quite informed. However, I do think it is important to
note that quantifying the threat is not that significant under the
terms of the question-that is, on the assumption that the
permanent members of the UN Security Council (plus Germany)
are more or less in agreement. If there were to be such agreement,
it seems highly likely that the UN Security Council would invoke its
Chapter VII powers to assure that Iran never completes the project.
This is in effect the scenario from the First Gulf War, when in the
honeymoon period following the collapse of the former Soviet
17. On April 4, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed will be referred to a military commission to stand trial. Peter
Finn, Khalid Sheik Mohammed to be Tried by Military Commission, WASH. POST, Apr. 4,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/khalid-sheik-mohammed-to-be2010,
tried-by-military-commission-officials-say/2011/04/04/AFhlS8cCstory.html.
18. See William J. Broad, John Markoff& David E. Sanger, Israeli Test on Worm
Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?-r=2.
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Union and prior to the development by the People's Republic of
China of the influence it now wields, it was possible for all members
of the UN Security Council to join in authorizing the invasion of
Iraq in order to liberate Kuwait.
Much more troubling would be a situation in which some
permanent members of the UN Security Council (probably led by
the United States) considered Iran's attainment of a nuclear
capability to be an imminent and an urgent threat to the peace,
while at least one other permanent member was of a different view.
This is the scenario that led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 without
the authorization of the UN Security Council. The UN Security
Council did recently authorize military action in Libya, but past
experience demonstrates how difficult it can be to get UN Security
Council approval for even the most urgently needed actions.
9. DOES THE U.S. HAVE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION USED IN DOMESTIC COURTS TO PROSECUTE
TERRORISTS?

Yes. The recent successful prosecution of Ahmed Khalfan
Ghailani in the Southern District of New York demonstrates that
existing safeguards are adequate. 9

10. WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE TO AMERICAN NATIONAL
SECURITY?

I do not know what the most important issue is, given the
broad sweep of the programs, doctrines, and problems that are
relevant. Within the narrower realm of national security law, the
persistent issue that I believe still urgently needs attention is the
state secrets doctrine.:0 The way the state secrets privilege has been
expanded in recent years constitutes a serious threat to the rule of
law." There are already a multitude of principles and precedents
19. See Clyde Haberman, A Verdict Replies to Terrorists, and to Critics,N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/nyregion/28nyc.html?_r=2;
Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Detainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 26,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/nyregion/26ghailani.html.
20. See Ten Questions: Responses ofJohn Cary Sims, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1593, 1604 (2007) (identifying the state secrets doctrine as the most important

question in national security law today).
21. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077-93

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss5/11
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that prevent full accountability for violations committed by
government officials. There is a sweeping system of classification,
and all information properly classified is exempt from release
under the Freedom of Information Act, so much wrongdoing never
comes to light. When individuals who have been injured by
misconduct touching upon national security sue for damages,22
courts are reluctant to even recognize a Bivens cause of action,
and even if they do acknowledge a Bivens cause of action the
doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity raise additional and
daunting obstacles.2 ' An injured party that discovers wrongdoing as
to which an official is not immune may still be barred from
recovering if Congress passes a statute immunizing the wrongful
conduct. These obstacles are substantial, and few claimants ever
successfully run the gauntlet necessary to recover. There is no
justification for adding an elastic state secrets doctrine to these
defenses.

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (affirming, on state secret grounds, dismissal of claims
brought by victims of the extraordinary rendition program).
22. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc)
("[affirming dismissal of a claim arising from rendition because] Congress has not
prohibited the practice, imposed limits on its use, or created a cause of action for
those who allege they have suffered constitutional injury as a consequence"), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
23. See, e.g., Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16192, at *37 (D.S.C.
Feb. 17, 2011) (dismissing constitutional tort claims based on alleged
mistreatment of Jose Padilla, on the basis that no Bivens claim may properly be
asserted, and that in any event defendants' alleged acts did not violate "clearly
established" law and therefore were entitled to qualified immunity).
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